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A FURTHER CRITIQUE OF THE FIXTURE SECTION
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
MORRIS G. SHANKER*
Section 9-313, the fixture section of the Uniform Commercial
Code, has been shown to be a potential source of serious problems.'
Partly, no doubt, because of these problems, California refused to
adopt this section when it enacted the Code; and Ohio, after living
with Section 9-313 for about a year, decided to revise it substantially. 2
Hence, a reappraisal of Section 9-313 is now taking place. In this reap-
praisal the consensus seems to be that both the underlying philosophies
and fundamental objectives of Section 9-313 are sound; 3
 and that the
problems of Section 9-313 arise from the specific mechanics which
have been adopted to accomplish its objectives. Thus, most of the
current discussion has been directed to the question of improving
these mechanics.'
The author has already contributed a major article to this aca-
demic dialogue!' The ideas contained therein will not be repeated
here. Rather, this paper will deal with two problem areas not previ-
ously covered by the author: (1) the indexing rules in Section 9-313
for a fixture financing statement and (2) the relationship of a Section
9-313 fixture security interest to a real estate improvement lien, partic-
ularly the construction mortgage and mechanics liens.
* B.S. in Electrical Engineering, Purdue University; Master of Business Administra-
tion, University of Michigan; Juris Doctor, University of Michigan. Visting Professor
of Law, University of Michigan (spring term 1963-64); Professor of Law, Western
Reserve University, since 1961. 1952-61, general practice of law, Grossman, Schlesinger &
Carter, Cleveland, Ohio. Special fields of interest: commercial law, particularly the Uni-
form Commercial Code, and bankruptcy.
See Coogan & Clovis, The Uniform Commercial Code and Real Estate Law, 38 Ind.
L.J. 535 (1963); Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1319 (1962).
2 Ohio no longer accepts Section 9-313's rule that the fixture security interest may
prevail over the prior real estate mortgagee, See discussion by Shanker, An Integrated
Financing System for Purchase Money Collateral: A Proposed Solution to the Fixture
Problem under Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 Yale L.J. 788 (1964).
8 Shanker, supra note 2. Kripke, Fixtures under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64
Colum. L. Rev. 44 (1964); Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 Harv. L. Rev.
1333 (1963), particularly at p. 1395 and following. For a contrary view, see Hollander,
Imperfections in Perfection of Ohio Fixture Liens, 14 W. Res. L. Rev. 683 (1963). Mr.
Hollander's views seem to have been accepted by the Ohio legislature in its revision of
Section 9-313 (Ohio Rev. Code Section 1309.32 effective Oct. 8, 1963).
4 See Shanker, supra note 2, at 790 and following; Kripke, supra note 3, at 48 and
following.
5 Shanker, supra note 2.
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I. THE INDEXING PROBLEM
A. Whose Name Should Appear on The Fixture Financing Statement
Section 9-401(1) (b) presently requires the fixture financing
statement to be filed in the real estate records.' The obvious pur-
pose of this rule is to permit real estate title searchers to discover
fixture security interests which may encumber the title to the land.
Nonetheless, as the Code now reads, it is quite possible that land title
searchers may be misled. This arises from the fact that only the
"debtor's" name is presently required on the fixture financing state-
ment.7
 Similarly the Code's indexing system is set up on a "debtor"
basis.' Real estate records, however, are normally searched and indexed
by the name of the "owner" or "lessee" of the land. Thus, confusion
is possible because the "debtor" who created the fixture security interest
is not the same person as the owner or lessee of the land where the
fixture is installed. An example would be the case where a building
contractor (the debtor) gives a security interest on a fixture to be
installed on land owned by another person.
For at least two reasons, however, the problem is not as critical
as might initially appear. First, a fixture financing statement must rea-
sonably identify the land on which the fixture is installed.° Thus, in
counties where land records are indexed by tract, the fixture security
interest would be discovered even though the debtor's name did not
correspond to the owner's name." Secondly, even in a county where
the official land records are indexed by the owner, a rather plausible
argument could then be made that the Code presently requires the
fixture financing statement to indicate the owner of the fixture (real
estate) where he is different from the person owing the obligation on
the fixture security interest. This stems from Section 9405(1) (d)
which defines "debtor" to include the owner of the collateral in any
part of Article 9 which deals with the collateral, if the "debtor" and
"owner" are not the same person. 1 '
6
 But see Shanker, supra note 2, at 796 and following, where the author proposes
that the Code be amended to require the filing of fixture financing statements both in
the chattel and the real estate records. If the author's proposals contained in his Yale
Law Journal article are accepted, then the thoughts contained in this article can readily
be adapted thereto. See further Kripke, supra note 3, at 51 and following, where he dis-
cusses this general problem and then proposes that fixture filings be recorded in the
chattel records with an additional filing in the real estate records at the option of the
fixture secured party.
7
 Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter cited as "U.C.C.") §§ 9-402(1), 9-402(3).
8
 U.C.C. § 9-403 (4) .
9
 U.C.C. g 9-402(1) and (3); U.C.C. § 9-110.
10 Even in counties where the official land records are indexed by the owner's name,
professional title companies who carry on much of the title searching in many large urban
areas often have established what amounts to their own private tract index. Thus, such
title companies are likely to discover the fixture security interest.
11 U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (d), in part, states the following:
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One cannot of course be certain, however, that this argument
would be sustained by the courts." It is even less sure that Section
9-105(1)(d) can be interpreted to permit or to require the listing on
the fixture financing statement of the name of a lessee or licensee who
is actually occupying the land but who is not the actual fee owner
thereof, even though he is the person for whom the fixture was installed
or with whom the fixture secured party had all of his dealings.
These ambiguities and uncertainties should be clarified by an
amendment to Section 9-402 specifically requiring the name of the
owner, lessee, or licensee in possession of the land to be listed on the
fixture financing statement in addition to the name of the debtor who
may have incurred the fixture obligation. Section 9-403 should then
also be amended to require filing officers to index financing statements
in both names. Thus, persons searching only the land records would
be put on notice of the fixure security interest. Similarly, persons
searching the usual debtor index would also discover the appropriate
financing statement. In fact, a number of states have already added
such a requirement. Unfortunately, most have required the listing to
be that of the "record" owner or lessee of the real estate." Certainly,
many situations can be imagined where the "record" owner or lessee
is not in fact the actual owner or the actual lessee in possession of
the land. Yet perfection of the fixture security interest in these states
will depend upon the financing statement listing the name of the
"record" land owner who may be entirely foreign to the fixture trans-
action. Thus, in these states, the fixture secured party must go to the
considerable burden and expense of a title land search to determine
who is the "record" owner. Such cost may seem relatively small when
the fixture is an elevator. On the other hand, it may be prohibitive
where the fixture is a wash basin.
The theory accepted by Article 9 was that the formalities needed
to perfect a security interest were to be minimized." Thus, to require
the fixure secured party to determine the "record" owner of land on ,
pain of losing his security interest seems a harsh bufden imposed
uniquely upon him and upon no other secured party.
Until the law of real property universally requires all land to be
Torrenized, whereby the "record" owner and "actual" owner of the
Where the debtor and the owner of the collateral are not the same person,
the term "debtor" means the owner of the collateral in any provision of the
Article dealing with the collateral, the obligor in any provision dealing with the
obligation, and may include both where the context so requires.
12 Until the courts do resolve this problem, cautious fixture secured parties should
certainly name both the debtor and the owner on the financing statement.
13 These states are as follows: Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. New
Hampshire requires the listing of the "known" record owner.
14 See Official Comments 3 and 5 to U.C.C. § 9 -402.
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land are equated, it seems unfair to require the fixture secured party
alone to search land records to be assured of his security interest.
It ought to be sufficient if the fixture secured party lists the actual
owner, the acual lessee, or the actual possessor of the land. In
the overwhelming number of cases, such persons will, in fact, also
turn out to be the record owner or record lessee of the land. If not,
the real estate description required on the fixure security financing
statement will be of substantial assistance in directing title searchers
to the parcel of land encumbered by the fixture security interest."
Some cases, notwithstanding, undoubtedly would arise where per-
sons relying on the real estate record, would not actually discover the
fixture security interest in the name of the actual owner. This is unfor-
tunate. It would not, however, be the first time that persons relying
on real estate records have been misled. Their misfortune arises from
the imperfections of our present real estate law which recognizes and
protects many non-record interests in non-Torrenized land. If correc-
tion is needed, then it should be brought about by a change in the
real estate laws and recording statutes. Until the state legislatures are
willing to do this, it seems the fixture secured party alone should not
be asked to bear the burden of their imperfection in giving complete
notice to title searchers.'
13. Indexing Security Interests on Torrenized Land
Where the fixture is to be installed on Torrenized land," the
present Code raises the question whether a financing statement filed
in the general mortgage records will be effective even though no nota-
tion thereof has been made on the Torrens title certificate.
The language of Section 9-401(1) (b) merely requires that fixture
financing statements be filed in the "office" where real estate mortgages
on that land would be filed. Where the fixture is installed on Torrenized
land, one might, therefore, make the argument that a general filing
in the "office" which holds the Torrens certificate is all that is required;
and that there is no further requirement that the security interest be
noted directly on the Torrens certificate. If this argument were sus-
tained, it might defeat a basic policy of the Torrens statutes, namely,
that all liens and encumbrances affecting the land should be noted
directly on the Torrens title certificate, so that title searchers may rely
entirely on said certificate.
On the other hand, an equally plausible argument in favor of
requiring notation on the Torrens certificate arises from Sections
15 See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
10 But see Coogan & Clovis, supra note 1, at 555, urging that the "record owner"
be required. Compare Kripke, supra note 3, at 70.
17 For another discussion of this problem, see Kripke, supra note 3, at 53.
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9-302(3) and (4). These sections continue the effect of any local
statutes beyond the Commercial Code which set up a certificate of title
law. They also make clear that Code security interest in collateral for
which a Certificate of Title has been issued can be perfected only by
notation on the Certificate. A strong argument certainly could be made
that Torrens statutes are certificate of title laws within the meaning
of 9-302(3) and (4).
However, these questions should not be left in an ambiguous state.
Probably they can be fully clarified by an amendment to the official
commentary sections of the Code, stating that fixture financing state-
ments dealing with Torrens land are subject to the certificate of title
provisions of Section 9-302; and that notation on the Torrens certifi-
cate is therefore essential to obtain perfection in fixtures installed
on such Torrens land.
IL THE FIXTURE SECURITY INTEREST AND THE REAL
ESTATE IMPROVEMENT LIEN
A. The Construction Mortgagee v. The Fixture Security Interest
Special attention must be given to the priority conflict between
a construction mortgage and a fixture security interest. An under-
lying assumption of Section 9-313 is that a fixture secured party
should be favored over a prior real estate mortgagee since the fixture
secured party added new value to the land upon which the prior real
estate mortgagee could not have relied when he advanced his funds.
Indeed, it is this assumption which justifies the Code's present priority
rule favoring the fixture security interest over the prior real estate
mortgagee!' Where a construction mortgage is involved, however,
this assumption is a specious one. Rather, the fact in this situation is
that the construction motgagee makes his advances with the clear
expectation that they will be secured by the new structure, including
its new fixtures."
Prior to the Code, most courts which considered this question
seemed impressed by this special and unique equity in favor of the
construction mortgagee and normally favored him over a conflicting
fixture security interest." However, these courts never seem to have
considered the fact that the fixture security party could claim precisely
the same kind of equity: namely, that he, too, had extended his credit
in the belief that its repayment would be secured by the new fixture.
It therefore appears that the construction mortgagee and the fixture
secured party can stake equal claims to the fixture in that both relied
18 See discussion by Shanker, supra note 2, at 790 and following.
10 Gilmore, supra note 3, discusses this problem at 1367 (under pre-Code laW) and
at 1398 (under the Uniform Commercial Code).
20 See cases cited by Gilmore, supra note 3, at 1267.
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on it to secure repayment of their advances. Superficially, there thus
seems little reason to favor one over the other.21
Notwithstanding, Section 9-313 has apparently adopted a policy
in favor of the fixture security interest which is timely perfected.
Under subsection 4 of Section 9-313 a construction mortgagee will
defeat a fixture security interest only to the extent that he actually
advances his funds or contracts for such advances without knowledge
of the fixture security interest and prior to its perfection.'
It seems that Section 9-313 has made the correct choice in thus
resolving the "conflict. This is so because the construction mortgagee
normally is in the better position to protect himself and to avoid loss
to the fixture secured party by controlling the disbursement of the
21 See discussion by Gilmore, supra note 3, at 1368.
22 In a conversation with the author in August, 1964, Professor Grant Gilmore
pointed to the possibility that the "contracted for" language in Section 9-313(4) might
be read to defeat any fixture security interest—even those which had been timely
perfected—by a prior mortgage which originally contained a future advance clause. If
this is the correct interpretation of Section 9-313(4), then prior mortgagees are divided
into two classes: (1) those whose mortgage instrument contains a future advance clause
and whose advances thereunder will defeat any fixture security interest; and (2) those
whose original mortgage instrument does not contain a future advance clause and
whose advances will defeat a fixture security interest only in the limited situations men-
tioned in the text.
Section 9-313(4) need not be read to create this dichotomy. Indeed, a more plausible
reading suggests that no advantage was intended in favor of the mortgagee making ad-
vances under a future advance clause contained in the original mortgage instrument
and the mortgagee whose original mortgage instrument contained no such clause. Instead,
both arc to be treated alike. Neither will defeat a fixture security interest under the
"contracted for" statutory language unless the contract for the subsequent advance is
made in the time interval between the fixture security interest coming into existence
("attaching" in U.C.C. § 9-204(1) parlance) and the perfection thereof.
This interpretation arises from the fact that Section 9-313(4) does not protect prior
mortgagees just because they have contracted for a future advance. A contractural com-
mitment is protected only if two other conditions accompany it: (1) the fixture
security interest is "not perfected" and (2) the mortgagee had "no knowledge" of the
fixture security interest. These two additional conditions are as much necessary to
bring the statute into operation in favor of prior mortgagees as is the contractual com-
mitment. Yet, these two additional conditions seem possible only with respect to fixture
security interests which are already in existence (attached).
One might, of course, argue that a future advance clause inserted in a mortgage at a
time when the fixture or a security interest therein was not even in existence is a con-
tractural commitment made by the mortgagee when technically he was without knowl-
edge of the nonexisting fixture security interest and before its perfection. It seems
more likely, however, that the Commercial Code uses the words "without knowledge"
to refer to one's individual ignorance respecting an existing state of affairs (see U.C.C.
§ 1-201(25)) and not to refer to the ignorance of mankind generally as to future events.
Similarly, it seems more likely that the Commercial Code uses the idea of "no perfection"
to refer to security interests which actually have already attached and thereby are
capable of being perfected (see U.C.C. § 9-303) and does not use the "no perfection"
idea to refer to security interests arising in the future which have no present possibility
of perfection.
For another discussion of.this problem and a plea for clarification thereof, see Kripke,
supra note 3, at 71.
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mortgage funds under safeguards which assure payment to those who
actually add the fixtures and other improvements to the land. If this
supervision of the mortgage disbursement is claimed to be a burden,
then it is one which most construction mortgagees have already as-
sumed. At worst, the only additional task imposed upon the construc-
tion mortgagee by Section 9-313 is that he check the fixture filings
before actually parting with his money.
Most construction mortgagees are financial institutions who must
constantly refer to the public filings. Thus, it is likely that the means
for making necessary fixture filing checks are already readily avail-
able to the typical construction mortgagee. If not, such an additional
investigation burden seems slight, in light of the present practice of
most construction mortgagees to demand architect certificates, con-
tractor's bills, subcontractor's bills, workman's bills, mechanics lien
releases, etc. before paying out any mortgage funds.
Thus Section 9-313, in favoring the fixture secured party over the
construction mortgagee, is merely recognizing the present facts of
commercial life. Accordingly, no change in its language is needed to
deal with this problem.' However, the official commentary probably
should be amended to make clear that pre-Code cases reaching a
contrary result are intended to be overruled.
B. The Fixture Security Interest and The Real Estate Mechanics Lien
A person installing a fixture may obtain a Code fixture security
interest for the purchase price. Under the law of most states he would
be equally entitled to obtain a mechanics lien. Section 9-313(1) seems
to preserve this right expressly.' Hence, unless state law beyond the
Code prohibits his so doing,' the fixture secured party can apparently
23
 Kripke, supra note 3, at 71 apparently agrees. At p. 71 he states that:
[T]here seems to be no need for a refinement [of § 9-313] in favor of
construction lenders. They can protect themselves by searches before each
advance, as many of them have always done under the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act.
24
 Section 9-313(1) reads, in part: "This Act does not prevent creation of an
incumbrance upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to real estate."
25
 According to Kripke, supra note 3, at 70, n. 78, the pre-Code New York and
Pennsylvania mechanics lien statutes prevented one from asserting both a conditional
sales contract on a fixture and a mechanics lien on the structure. The Ohio Mechanics
Lien Law may also be an example of a state statute beyond the Commercial Code which
prohibits a party from both obtaining a fixture security interest and a mechanics lien.
Section 1311.22 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that , a mechanics lien:
. shall [not] be defeated or waived by the taking by the lien claimant from
any person of any promissory note or any security for such debt other than
upon the real estate itself • . • (Emphasis supplied.)
Query: does the taking of a fixture security interest amount to the taking of a lien upon
the real estate in which the fixture is installed. This problem has been, as yet, unresolved
by the Ohio courts. In light of Ohio's revision of Section 9-313 (see text accompanying
note 2), it is unlikely that the problem will ever be presented.
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obtain both a mechanics lien and a Code security interest for having
installed the same fixture.
However,' fixture security interests and mechanics liens differ
markedly with respect to their effect and enforcement. The typical
mechanics lien statute gives a lien on the entire structure (including
the fixtures installed therein). However, that total structure must
normally be shared with other mechanics liens which arise from other
improvements called for by the same general construction contract
which authorized installation of the fixture.
On the other hand, where a fixture security interest is involved,
Section 9-313 permits the secured party to claim a paramount right
to the fixture over all other real estate interests. 2° Thus, a claimant
who has taken care to obtain both a mechanics lien and a fixture
security interest is in an enviable position. He may first remove the
fixture for the purpose of foreclosures on his security interest." This,
of course, diminishes the value of the remaining structure for those
who have filed only mechanics liens. Nonetheless, if the fixture does
not bring full collection to the fixture claimant, he may then appar-
ently turn to his mechanics lien on the remaining structure to collect
the balance. In this step, the fixture claimant will probably have to
share the remaining value of the structure with other mechanics liens
arising from the same general construction contract. This may not
concern the fixture claimant who has already eaten his proverbial
cake and still continues to enjoy it. However, it may be rather offen-
sive to the other mechanics, who have already lost the full value of
the removed fixture to the fixture claimant, to now have to share the
balance of the structure with the fixture claimant.
This may be an inequity so far as the other mechanics lienors
are concerned. However, the Commercial Code is probably not the
place to determine whether a fixture secured party should also have
full advantage of the local mechanics lien laws; or whether some limi-
tations ought to be imposed.28
 That is best left to local determination.
An amendment to the Code's commentary sections may, however, be
in order to remind the states that they are free to limit the right of
one who has enforced a fixture security interest from also having the
full advantage of the local mechanics lien laws.
26
 See Shanker, supra note 2, at 790.
27 U.C.C. § 9-313(5).
28 Compare Kripke, supra note 3, at 70, arguing that persons who sell chattels
knowing that the buyer will install them in buildings owned by others should be denied
a Commercial Code security interest, and should be required to look only to mechanics
lien statutes for protection.
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